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Aphantasia, i.e., the congenital inability to experience voluntary mental imagery, offers a
new model for studying the functional role of mental imagery in (visual) cognition. How-
ever, until now, there have been no studies investigating whether aphantasia can be linked
to specific impairments in cognitive functioning. Here, we assess visual working memory
performance in an aphantasic individual. We find that she performs significantly worse
than controls on the most difficult (i.e., requiring the highest degree of precision) visual
working memory trials. Surprisingly, her performance on a task designed to involve mental
imagery did not differ from controls', although she lacked metacognitive insight into her
performance. Together, these results indicate that although a lack of mental imagery can
be compensated for under some conditions, mental imagery has a functional role in other
areas of visual cognition, one of which is high-precision working memory.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Aphantasia refers to the inability to generate mental images
(Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015). Individuals affected by
aphantasia cannot experience the sensory qualities of objects
that are not physically presented to them. Although the phe-
nomenon was already described nearly 150 years ago (Galton,
1880), it has recently (re)gained public and scientific interest
(Zeman et al., 2010, 2015). A study by Zeman et al. described a
case of acquired aphantasia as a result of a coronary angio-
plasty procedure (Zeman et al., 2010). They found that theces Research Institute (IP
vain.be (C. Jacobs).
rved.
., et al., Visual working mpatient behaved accurately on tasks of visual mental imagery
and visual memory, from which they concluded that he must
have utilized alternative cognitive processes, rather mental
imagery, to perform these tasks. fMRI data showed that he
reliedmore heavily on frontal brain areas, whereas in controls
a posterior network of brain regions was more active,
corroborating the idea that he made use of an alternative
cognitive strategy. Another study described a group of twenty-
one individuals who had never experienced voluntary mental
imagery at any moment during their lifetime (Zeman et al.,
2015). Many of these congenital aphantasics self-reportedSY), Universite Catholique de Louvain, Place Cardinal Mercier 10,
emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
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not systematically examine the cognitive functioning of these
individuals. Here, we examined the functioning of visual
working memory in a case of congenital aphantasia.
Visual working memory and mental imagery are two
processes that both depend on the representation and
manipulation of visual mental content not driven by current
visual input. Even though they share this important feature,
within the field of cognitive psychology the two processes
have been mostly researched independently (e.g., Tong,
2013), although some investigations on the link between vi-
sual working memory and visual imagery have been pub-
lished. Early work did not find a positive relationship between
the two cognitive processes (Heuer, Fischman, & Reisberg,
1986; Reisberg, Culver, Heuer, & Fischman, 1986; Reisberg &
Leak, 1987), but more recently, strength of mental imagery
was found to correlate with visual working memory perfor-
mance (Keogh & Pearson, 2011), and working memory ca-
pacity (Keogh & Pearson, 2014). In addition, both processes
have shown to be sensitive to visual interference by task-
irrelevant visual input (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000; Keogh &
Pearson, 2011, 2014, although see; Borst, Niven, & Logie,
2012), especially when the participants were strong-imagers
(Keogh & Pearson, 2011, 2014), indicating that this subset of
participants most likely adopts a cognitive strategy involving
mental imagery when executing visual working memory
tasks. At the same time, this would mean that for many in-
dividuals mental imagery is of no functional relevance for
working memory. Thus even if (strong) imagery might be
beneficial to visual working memory, it is not a prerequisite
for adequate performance. On the other hand, there are
studies showing that mental imagery relies on the same
cognitive structures underlying visual working memory.
Baddeley and Andrade (2000) have shown that disruption of
the visuospatial sketchpad, one of working memory's so-
called slave systems, reduces the vividness of mental im-
ages representing information retrieved from long-term
memory. A close correspondence between representations
underlying visual working memory and visual imagery has
been demonstrated, both cognitive (Borst, Ganis, Thompson,
& Kosslyn, 2012), and neural (Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, &
De Lange, 2013; Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2012). Clin-
ical work with schizophrenic patients demonstrated that
even though this patient group suffers fromworkingmemory
impairments, they are faster at mental image generation
than matched controls (Matthews, Collins, Thakkar, & Park,
2014). However, the same study also showed that the
enhanced mental imagery capacity could be abolished by
increasing the concurrent working memory load.
Here, we further examine this functional relationship by
examining the working memory performance of an individ-
ual, who in her own experience is incapable of mental image
generation since birth. We investigated multiple aspects of
(visual) working memory, i.e., visual working memory ca-
pacity, metacognitive performance for remembered infor-
mation, and the role of feature binding in visual working
memory. We also carried out a general working memory ca-
pacity battery to control for any differences in working
memory performance that are not specific to visual informa-
tion. In a similar effort to rule out generic differences betweenPlease cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
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measured in all participants as well. We designed a spatial
working memory task which tested participants' memory for
the contours of geometric shapes after a 4-sec delay period,
and we included an equivalent mental imagery task that
required participants to generate a mental representation of
the same stimuli. We hypothesized that the aphantasic indi-
vidual would perform worse than controls on the mental
imagery version of the task. If mental imagery is essential to
visual working memory, she would show impaired perfor-
mance also on the working memory version. Alternatively,
she could have developed compensatory strategies for those
tasks in which typical individuals would resort to mental
imagery. In that case, her performance pattern across visual
working memory tasks could diverge from that of the typical
individuals in any possible way. Finally, if there are no dif-
ferences between the aphantasic individual and the control
group, the parsimonious conclusion would be that mental
imagery does not seem instrumental to visual working
memory altogether.
We also included the change detection task designed by
Wheeler and Treisman (2002) to measure visual working
memory performance for feature-bound objects as opposed to
single-feature working memory. Mental imagery involves the
generation of integrated, featured-bound visual images, but
single visual features, like color or shape, can be passively and
unconsciously stored in working memory without the need to
be integrated into object-like representations. We therefore
hypothesized that if the aphantasic individual shows visual
working memory deficits, these might be limited to working
memory for feature-bound stimuli, while leaving single-
feature memory unaffected.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
2.1.1. Aphantasic individual
The aphantasic individual (AI, not actual initials) was a female
31y9m of age. At the time of testing she was a PhD student.
She had recently come across aphantasia through communi-
cations about the phenomenon in popular media, and found
that her personal experiences were similar to the experiences
described there. She contacted our research group to offer to
volunteer in further research on the phenomenon of aphan-
tasia. Her vision was corrected-to-normal. She was compen-
sated for her participation through gift vouchers.
2.1.2. Control participants
11 control participants were included in the study. All of
them were female and their average age was 31y0m
(SD ¼ 28 m). All control participants were in possession of at
least a Master's degree and had varying vocational back-
grounds (7 graduate students or academics, 3 individuals
working in business, 1 graphic designer). As average IQ
scores did not match AI's, we selected a subgroup of 4 par-
ticipants with matching IQs to additionally compare her with
(see Section 3.2). This subgroup had a mean age of 31y5m of
age and consisted of 2 women working in industry and 2emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 3 3graduate students. All control participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were compensated for
participation through gift vouchers.
2.2. Behavioral tasks
Behavioral testing was split over 3 separate sessions of about
1.5e2 h each. Task order was identical across all participants
to ensure that any learning/fatigue effects were equivalent for
AI and the control participants. See Table 1 for an overview of
task order across sessions.
2.2.1. Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ)
The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) is a questionnaire that assesses the
strength of visual mental imagery. On each of its four com-
ponents, the participant is instructed to visualize a particular
scene (e.g., “think of some relative or friend whom you frequently
see (but who is not with you at present) and consider carefully the
picture that comes before your mind's eye”) and to subsequently
rate the vividness of four different aspects of the created
mental image (e.g., “the exact contour of face, head, shoulders and
body”) on a scale from 1 (“No image at all, you only “know” that
you are thinking of the object”) to 5 (“Perfectly clear and lively as real
seeing”). Minimum and maximum scores on the VVIQ are
therefore 16 and 80, respectively. In all recent studies on the
phenomenon of aphantasia (Zeman et al., 2015; Zeman et al.,
2010) the VVIQ is the diagnostic tool used to identify individual
cases of aphantasia.
2.2.2. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV)
The U.K. Version of the WAIS-IV (Pearson PLC, London, UK)
was administered to assess overall IQ of all participants in
order to match control participants' IQ to that of the aphan-
tasic individual. The full-scale IQ is based on the individuals'
scores on 10 separate tasks tapping into a variety of skills.
Based on the grouped scores of particular selections of the 10
tasks four separate subscales can be calculated: verbal
comprehension (VCI; combined scores on Similarity, Vocab-
ulary, and Information tasks), working memory (WMI; com-
bined scores on the Digit Span and Arithmetic tasks),
perceptual reasoning (PRI; combined scores on the Block
Design, Matrix Reasoning, and Visual Puzzles tasks), and
processing speed (PSI; combined scores of Symbol Search and
Coding tasks). WMI is calculated from the combined scores on
a digit span task and arithmetic task, neither of which
explicitly tests visual working memory performance.
2.2.3. Working Memory Capacity (WMC) battery
To assess working memory capacity, we used the tests
developed and validated by Lewandowsky, Oberauer, Yang,
and Ecker (2010). This WMC battery consists of four tasks: 1)
memory updating; 2) operation span; 3) sentence span; 4)
spatial working memory. A brief description of each of theTable 1 e Order in which task were administered for all particip
Session 1
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) Visual Wor
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale e IV (WAIS e IV) Working M
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study (Lewandowsky et al., 2010).
1) Memory updating (MU; Fig. 1a): at the start of each trial
the black outline of 3, 4 or 5 empty boxes (placeholders)
appeared on a white background, after which single digits
were presented sequentially in each of the placeholders for
1000 msec. The digits could range from 1 to 9 and the partic-
ipant was instructed to remember which number had
appeared in which placeholder. After this initial encoding
phase, sequential arithmetic operations were presented
within (a subset of) the placeholders. The operations could be
anything from “7” to “þ7”, except “0”. The participants were
required to perform each arithmetic operation on the digit
they had encoded for that placeholder, and from then on
remember the outcome (i.e., memory updating) as the new
digit for that spatial position. Each operation was presented
for 1300msec and the overall number of arithmetic operations
varied between 2 and 6 per trial. Multiple arithmetic opera-
tions could appear within a single placeholder. At the end of
the trial, sequential question marks in each of the place-
holders prompted the participant to enter the last digit they
remembered for each location. Total number of trials was 15.
2) Operation span (OS; Fig. 1b): participants were asked to
judge whether or not simple, centrally presented equations
were correct (an example of an incorrect equation is
“5þ 1¼ 7”). Each time after they had indicated through button
press whether an equation was correct or not, a consonant
would appear on screen. After a 1000 msec interval the next
equation appeared. At the end of a trial a question mark
prompted participants to report the letters they had memo-
rized on that trial in the correct order. The number of equa-
tions/letters per trial varied between four and eight. Total
number of trials was 15.
3) Sentence span (SS; Fig. 1c): identical to the OS task,
except now instead of equations participants were asked to
judge whether simple statements were true or false (an
example of an untrue statement is “Every flower is a rose”).
The sentences consisted of 8e11 words and the number of
presented sentences varied between 3 and 7. Total number of
trials was 15.
4) Spatial short-termmemory (SSTM; Fig. 1d): at the start of
each trial a grid of 10  10 cells appeared on screen. In one of
the cells a solid black dot appeared for 900 msec and then
disappeared again, after which a dot appeared and dis-
appeared in a different cell, and so on. The length of the dot
sequence varied from 2 to 6. At the end of the trial, partici-
pants were asked to “reconstruct the dots”. At this stage, par-
ticipants recreated the pattern of dots that was presented to
them, not necessarily in the original order of representation. A
mouse click in any of the cells generated a black dot in that
cell. Participants were instructed that the relative distance
between the dots was more important than their precise in-
dividual locations. Total number of trials was 30.ants.
Session 2 Session 3
king Memory (WM) task Imagery (IM) task
emory Capacity (WMC) battery Change detection (CD) task
emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
Fig. 1 e The Working Memory Capacity (WMC) battery. A) An example trial for the Memory Updating (MU) task. During the
digit presentation phase of the task, the digits are presented within the predefined placeholders sequentially. After the digit
presentation phase, arithmetic operations are sequentially presented within the placeholders. Participants applied such
operations to their current working memory representation for the placeholder in question and then updated this
representation with the resultant numerical value. At the response stage participants were prompted to enter the current
memory representation for each of the placeholders. B) An example trial for the Operation Span (OS) task. Participants
indicated whether sequentially presented visual equations were correct or incorrect. After each equation, they were
presented with a letter, which they were instructed to memorize. At the end of each trial, participants were prompted to
reproduce the remembered letter string in the correct order of presentation. C) An example trial for the Sentence Span (OS)
task. Participants indicated whether sequentially presented visual sentences made sense or not. After each equation, they
were presented with a letter, which they were instructed to memorize. At the end of each trial, participants were prompted
to reproduce the remembered letter string in the correct order of presentation. D) An example trial for the Spatial Short-
TermMemory (SSTM) task. Participants were presented with a 10£ 10 grid. Black dots appeared sequentially in some of the
grid cells. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to reconstruct the pattern of the dots by mouse clicking in the
corresponding cells. (see Lewandowsky et al., 2010 for more information the WMC battery).
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HP, Palo Alto, CA) at 85 Hz refresh rate and run in Matlab
v2009a (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA) with PsychToolbox
v3.0.9. Accuracy data were analyzed with the SPSS syntax file
(IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0. Armonk, NY)
provided by the developers of the toolbox. Execution of this
syntax file converted the individual's data as recorded in the
Matlab logfiles into a single value representing the mean
proportion of correctly recalled items for the MU, OS, and SS
task. For the SSTM task the value would represent themean of
the dot-to-dot similarities divided by the full-match similarity
(see original paper by Lewandowsky et al. (2010) for further
details on scoring).Please cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
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We designed this set of tasks in order to compare (meta-
cognitive) performance on a visual working memory task and
a matched mental imagery task. In the Visual Working
Memory (WM; Fig. 2) version of the task, each trial startedwith
the presentation of the name of a geometric shape (i.e., dia-
mond, triangle or parallelogram e we chose these shapes,
because they are easy to construct on the basis of the four
placeholders demarcating the visual field area) for 500 msec,
after which the corresponding geometric shapewas presented
in the center of the screen for 1500msec. A square noisemask
appeared on screen for 200 msec to prevent the generation of
an afterimage. After a 4000 msec delay period, a small (2  2emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
Fig. 2 e Visual Working Memory (WM) and Mental Imagery
(IM) tasks. The name of one of three geometric shapes (i.e.,
diamond, parallelogram, or triangle) appeared on screen
for 500 msec. In the working memory version of the task
(left), the corresponding shape was visually presented
within four placeholders for 1500 msec. In the imagery
version (right), only the place holders were shown and
participants were instructed to construct the mental image
of the shape within the area of the visual field demarcated
by the place holders. A randomnoise stimulusmasked any
potential afterimages. After a 4000 msec delay period, a
target dot appeared on screen. Participants were instructed
to indicate by button press whether the target stimulus
appeared within the boundaries of the original (WM) or
constructed (IM) stimulus. They subsequently rated how
confident they felt about this response on a 1e4 scale.
Fig. 3 e Change detection task. An initial display of
multiple stimuli of different colors and shapes appeared
for 150 msec. After a 900 msec delay period, a second test
display appeared with the same number of stimuli
presented in the same locations on screen. Participants
were to indicate whether the test display contained the
same colored shapes as the initial display (location-
matching impossible, because the stimuli would swap
always swap positions from initial to test display). Non-
matches could results from two colors being replaced by
new ones (color non-match), two shapes being replaced by
new ones (shape non-match) or two shapes swapping
color (binding non-match). Conditions were blocked, so
participants were aware that they were to detect color
changes, shape changes, color-or-shape changes, or
binding non-matches in each block.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 3 5pixels) black dot appeared on screen. Pre-defined difficulty
levels were created by varying the distance between the
boundaries of the (imagined) geometric shape and the loca-
tion of black target dot.We included three levels of difficulty in
our design (thus the target dot could appear at three different
distances from shape stimulus boundaries). Within a diffi-
culty condition, potential target dot locations were all equally
distant from the geometric shape's boundary. Participants
were instructed to indicate by button press whether they
believed the dot to be within or outside of the boundaries of
the original geometric shape. After they had given their initial
responses, participants were prompted to indicate on a 1e4
scale how confident they felt about the response they had just
given (1¼ “low confidence“; 2¼ “low tomoderate confidence”;
3¼ “moderate to high confidence”, 4¼ “high confidence”). The
Imagery (IM; Fig. 2) version of the taskwas identical to theWM
task in every aspect, apart from the stimulus presentation
stage. Instead of actually showing the geometric shape, only
the four placeholders, which marked the area of the visual
field in which the stimuli had to be imagined, were offered to
the participants forcing them to construct a mental image of
the geometric shape based exclusively on the initial verbal
instruction. The shapes (i.e., triangle, diamond or parallelo-
gram) were specifically chosen so that they only occupied half
of the area of the visual field demarcated by the placeholder,Please cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014so that the target dot can appear within the demarcated area,
but still fall outside the contours of the imagined geometric
shape. Task instructionswere varied slightly for participant AI
(from “you are to imagine” to “you are to retrieve”), because she
would not be able to execute the instruction to mentally
imagine a visual object and just asking her to retrieve it from
memory gave her the freedom to do that in whatever
preferred way.
2.2.5. Change detection task
In order to examine whether inability to engage in imagery
affects working memory for feature-bound percepts, we
slightly modified one of the tasks described in Wheeler and
Treisman (2002), which was specifically designed to compare
visual working memory for separate features versus bound
objects. The task is fundamentally a change detection task
(Fig. 3). At the start of each trial participants were presented
with a stimulus display consisting of three, four or five simple
shapes in different colors for 150 msec. After a delay of
900 msec a test display would appear containing the same
number of colored shapes. All shapes always changed spatial
position from initial to test display, but their potential new
location was limited to those spatial locations at which a
stimulus had also been presented on the initial display. Par-
ticipantswere to indicate via button press whether the stimuli
on the initial and test display were identical. Test stimuliemory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
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Fig. 4 e Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ)
scores. VVIQ scores of the aphantasic individual (AI; left;
darkest gray), IQ-matched controls (N ¼ 4; intermediate
gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 11; light gray).
Error bars represent standard deviations. Sixteen is the
minimal score (dotted line).
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 36could be different in a number of ways. In the color condition,
the color of two stimuli changed into new colors, which were
not present on the initial display. In the shape condition, two
stimuli changed into new shapes, which were not present on
the initial display. These conditions were blocked so the par-
ticipants knew beforehand whether to pay attention to colors
or shapes presented in the initial display. There was a third,
either condition, which consisted of blocks in which either
feature could change from initial to test display. Finally, in the
binding condition all the initial colors and shapes were present
in the test display, but two shapes had swapped color. Each
block consisted of 48 trials and was repeated once, thus add-
ing up to 384 trials in total. The order of blocks was pseudor-
andomised for the first participant and the resulting block
order was then used for all other participants. Participants
were instructed to repeat the words “Coca-Cola” throughout
the experiment to prevent them falling back on verbal
encoding of the stimuli (i.e., articulatory suppression). Par-
ticipants received feedback on their performance on a trial-
by-trial basis.
2.3. Data analyses
We report effect sizes and the outcome of significance tests on
the differences between AI and the control participants.
Crawford and Garthwaite (2012) have recently compared
different commonly used methods for significance testing in
single-case studies. They recommend calculation and report
of the t-statistic for the single case under the estimated t-
distribution of the control sample based on their mean,
standard deviation, and sample size (i.e., degrees of freedom),
which also allows comparison of the corresponding p-value to
a critical alpha value as a test for statistical significance. In
addition, they strongly suggest reporting the z-value as an
indicator of estimated effect size, as it reflects the average
difference (in standard deviations) between the control
group's mean and the case's score irrespective of sample size.
We decided to follow their recommendations and report all
these statistics, including their 95% confidence intervals, in an
effort to objectify the described results. In order to calculate
these values, we used the software package (Singlims_ES)
designed for this purpose by Crawford and Garthwaite and
available online (http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/j.crawford/
pages/dept/Single_Case_Effect_Sizes.htm). Because we hy-
pothesized AI to perform worse than controls on the experi-
mental tasks, all the reported p-values are one-tailed, unless
otherwise specified.3. Results
3.1. VVIQ
Consistent with her self-acknowledged complete lack of
mental imagery, AI gave her mental images the lowest
possible score of 16. The control participants' VVIQ scores
were in a much higher range [mean ¼ 61.1, SD ¼ 7.6;
t(10) ¼ 5.66, p < .01.; Fig. 4]. The control participant with the
lowest score had an overall score of 51, which is an average of
3.2 per item. A rating of 3 corresponds to having a “moderatelyPlease cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
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matched controls had an average VVIQ score of 59.8
[SD¼ 5.91; t(3)¼6.62, p < .01]. Based on these VVIQ scores, we
conclude that we are indeed comparing a genuinely aphan-
tasic individual to a group of control participants with unim-
paired visual mental imagery.
3.2. WAIS-IV
AI's full-scale IQ was 126, whereas the average IQ of our con-
trol group was 116 (SD ¼ 9.9). Within the control group there
were four participants with a full-scale IQ of above 120, and an
average full-scale IQ of exactly 126 (SD ¼ 8.1). For all of the
experimental tasks, as described in the next sections, we will
compare the AI's score to both thewhole control group, aswell
as the sub-group of the four IQ-matched control participants.
AI's WMI score (122) was 10 points higher than that of IQ-
matched controls. Thus, we conclude that AI's general work-
ing memory abilities are unimpaired.
3.3. Working Memory Capacity (WMC)
AI's performance was superior to the performance of the
control group on nearly all tasks (see Table 2). However, as
WM and IQ are inherently related and the control group's
overall mean IQ is lower than AI's, it is more informative to
compare her performance to that of the IQ-matched control
group. Reflecting this relationship between working memory
capacity and IQ, the difference in performance between AI
and the sub-group of participants matched for IQ is much less
pronounced (see Table 3). The only sub-test on which AI
underperforms compared to controls is the sentence judg-
ment part of the SS task (i.e., SSpt); AI shows about 10e12
percent worse performance (.80) than the IQ-matched
[mean ¼ .92; t(3) ¼ 1.45, p ¼ .12] and general control group
[mean ¼ .90; t(10) ¼ 1.60, p ¼ .071], respectively, but these
differences did not reach statistical significance. This finding
is in line with the pattern of results on the WAIS-IV in whichemory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
Table 2 e Descriptives, significance tests, and effect sizes for the comparison between AI and the overall control group.
Task Control group AI Significance test Effect size
n Mean SD t p (1-tailed) ES Lower Upper
VVIQ 11 61.09 7.63 16 5.66 >.01 (*) 5.91 8.51 3.29
WAIS Subscales
VCI 11 119.91 9.38 110 1.01 .17
PRI 11 113.09 10.99 125 1.04 .84
WMI 11 104.54 11.27 122 1.48 .92
PSI 11 110.36 11.39 127 1.40 .90
WMC battery
MU 11 .59 .15 .70 .70 .75
OS 11 .66 .12 .77 .88 .80
OSpt 11 .86 .07 .93 .96 .82
SS 11 .69 .11 .75 .52 .69
SSpt 11 .90 .06 .80 1.60 .071
SSTM 11 .84 .04 .88 .96 .82
WM/IM
Accuracy
WM 11 .90 .04 .87 .65 .26
IM 11 .89 .04 .85 .91 .19
Confidence
WM 10 3.01 .54 3.13 .22 .58
IM 10 2.95 .49 3.05 .20 .57
Metacognitive accuracy
WM 10 .75 .43 1.10 .78 .77
IM 10 .64 .50 .75 .21 .58
CD
Accuracy
Color 11 .86 .09 .92 .61 .72
Shape 11 .73 .06 .73 .08 .47
Either shape 11 .70 .07 .81 1.39 .90
Either Color 11 .79 .09 .96 1.84 .95
Binding 11 .64 .08 .73 1.12 .86
Asterisk indicates p-value smaller than alpha (.05).
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 3 7AI outperformed controls on all but the verbal subscale (see
Table 2). In summary, AI's general working memory capacity
is unimpaired with the possible exception of verbal working
memory potentially due to a general impairment in verbal
information processing.
3.4. WM and IM tasks
Control participants performed well on both the WM as well
as the IM version of the task (means of 90 and 89%, respec-
tively). Accuracy on both the WM and the IM version of the
task was slightly higher (2e3%) in the control group than was
AI's performance, but none of these differences were (close to)
significant (p > .40; Fig. 5). This result is quite striking, as we
would expect that AI's absence of mental imagery would give
her a disadvantage, at least in the imagery condition in which
participants had to mentally construct the visual stimuli
themselves. However, her performance on neither task ap-
pears to suffer from her aphantasia. Confidence data were
also very similar between the controls and AI (Confidence
ratings were not recorded in one participant and we therefore
had to exclude their data from these analyses). Confidence
levels were generally high, with an average confidence rating
of approximately 3 (out of 4) in both versions of the task (see
Tables 2 and 3). Thus, AI's aphantasia did neither affect ac-
curacy nor confidence in a negative way.Please cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014We then calculated the average confidence for trials on
correct versus incorrect trials, and subsequently subtracted
these numbers. The resulting statistic reflects metacognitive
accuracy, i.e., how adequately a participant can distinguish
between their correct and incorrect responses. When
comparing AI to the IQ-matched controls on this measure, an
interesting dissociation appears. There is no difference in
metacognitive accuracy for working memory, but AI's meta-
cognitive accuracy is significantly reduced for the IM version
of the task [t(2) ¼ 3.15, p ¼ .044; Fig. 6]. This is driven by a
significant difference in average rating for the inaccurate trials
[t(2) ¼ 4.579, p ¼ .045, two-tailed], which AI endorses with a
higher confidence rating (2.41) than IQ-matched controls
(mean ¼ 1.95).
Data was also investigated per level of difficulty. In the
most difficult condition, AIs performance (67% correct) was
worse than controls in the working memory version, but not
in the imagery version of the task, both when compared to the
overall control group [80% correct; t(10) ¼ 2.11, p ¼ .031; effect
size z¼2.20 (CI¼3.31:1.07)] as well as when compared to
the IQ-matched controls although this difference did not quite
reach statistical significance [83% correct; t(3)¼2.20, p¼ .058;
effect size z ¼ 2.46 (CI ¼ 4.55: .35); Fig. 7]. There were no
significant differences or trends towards differences between
AI and controls in the easier conditions, and there were no
difficulty effects on the confidence ratings or metacognitiveemory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
Table 3 e Descriptives, significance tests, and effect sizes for the comparison between AI and the IQ-matched control group.
Task Control group AI Significance test Effect size
n Mean SD t p (2-tailed) ES Lower Upper
VVIQ 4 59.75 5.91 16 6.62 <.01 (*) 7.40 13.14 1.87
WAIS Subscales
VCI 4 127.00 4.08 110 3.73 .017 (*) 4.16 7.47 .92
PRI 4 121.50 9.15 125 .34 .62
WMI 4 111.50 7.55 122 1.24 .85
PSI 4 119.25 12.82 127 .54 .69
WMC battery
MU 4 .70 .09 .70 .05 .52
OS 4 .70 .12 .77 .52 .68
OSpt 4 .92 .04 .93 .23 .58
SS 4 .73 .10 .75 .22 .58
SSpt 4 .92 .07 .80 1.45 .12
SSTM 4 .87 .03 .88 .28 .60
WM/IM
Accuracy
WM 4 .91 .05 .87 .75 .26
IM 4 .89 .06 .85 .60 .30
Confidence
WM 3 3.08 .44 3.13 .11 .54
IM 3 3.00 .18 3.05 .26 .58
Metacognitive accuracy
WM 3 .92 .18 1.10 .87 .76
IM 3 1.15 .11 .75 3.15 .044 (*) 3.64 7.13 .29
CD
Accuracy
Color 4 .93 .04 .92 .23 .42
Shape 4 .78 .05 .73 .93 .21
Either shape 4 .74 .08 .81 .81 .76
Either color 4 .86 .07 .96 1.26 .85
Binding 4 .66 .09 .73 .66 .72
Asterisks indicate p-values smaller than alpha (.05).
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c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 38performance either. This result might reflect control partici-
pants resorting to mental imagery when the target dot ap-
pears too close to the original image contours, a strategy
which is unavailable to AI. To test this hypothesis, we calcu-
lated the linear correlation between WM accuracy and VVIQ
scores in our control sample. The resultant Pearson's linear
correlation coefficient showed a positive trend (Pearson's
r ¼ .55; p ¼ .079, uncorrected) (Fig. 8). We also calculated .50
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Fig. 5 e Performance on Visual Working Memory (WM) and
Mental Imagery (IM) tasks. Proportion of correct trials per
task (left: WM; right: IM) for the aphantasic individual (AI;
darkest gray), IQ-matched controls (N ¼ 4; intermediate
gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 11; light gray).
Error bars represent standard deviations. .5 is chance level.
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10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014correlations with VVIQ for accuracies in the other difficulty
conditions and for accuracies in the different levels of the IM
version of the task. None of these showed any trends towards
significance (all p-values >.17, uncorrected). .00
 .50
1.00
M
et
ac
og
ni
tiv
e 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
(C
on
fid
en
ce
 in
 a
cc
ur
at
e 
-i
na
cc
ur
at
e 
re
sp
o
AI IQ-matched controls Whole control group
Fig. 6 eMetacognitive accuracy. Difference scores between
the average confidence rating for correct and the average
confidence rating for incorrect trials split out for the Visual
Working Memory (WM) and Mental Imagery (IM) tasks.
Bars represent differences scores for the aphantasic
individual (AI; darkest gray), IQ-matched controls (N ¼ 3;
intermediate gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 10;
light gray). Error bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 7 e Performance on Visual Working Memory (WM) and
Mental Imagery (IM) tasks split out for difficulty level.
Proportion of correct trials per task (lower panel: WM;
upper panel: IM) for the aphantasic individual (AI; darkest
gray), IQ-matched controls (N ¼ 4; intermediate gray), and
the overall control group (N ¼ 11; light gray) per level of
difficulty (left: high; middle: medium; right: low). Difficulty
was based on the relative difference between the boundary
of the geometric shape and the location of the target
stimulus. Error bars represent standard deviations. .5 is
chance level.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 3 9Altogether, we conclude that even though overall task
performance on neither one of the tasks is any different for AI
than for control participants, her metacognitive accuracy is
lower when a task involves mental imagery, but not when it
simply requires visual working memory. Surprisingly, how-
ever, AI's visual working memory seems to be less precise
than controls', as reflected by her performance drop in the
most difficult condition; a property which does not transfer to
the mental imagery version of the task.
3.5. Change detection task
The accuracy data for the overall control group closely
resemble the data pattern as reported in the original paper by
Wheeler and Treisman (2002) with color conditions being
easier than shape conditions, single-feature conditions being
easier than either conditions (in which participants did notPlease cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014know beforehand whether the color or shape were changing
on non-match trials) and the binding condition being the
hardest. However, AI's performance pattern is deviant. As in
controls, AI performs worst in the binding condition and color
conditions are harder than shape conditions, but unlike con-
trols, AI performs better in the either conditions, rather than
in the single feature conditions. We investigated this pattern
further by computing difference scores between both color
conditions and both shape conditions for all participants and
running our significance tests on these values. For the color
feature, there is no significant difference between AI and the
controls (ps > .20, two-tailed; Fig. 9). However, there was a
trend in the direction of better performance in the either blocks
for the shape conditions both for the overall control group
[t(10) ¼ 1.881, p ¼ .090, two-tailed], and the IQ matched con-
trols [t(3)¼ 2.957, p¼ .060, two-tailed; Fig. 10]. These analyses
were all run on the data collapsed across load. There were no
load-specific effects in the data.4. Discussion
In order to investigate the functional role ofmental imagery in
visual working memory, we compared performance of a
congenitally aphantasic individual to that of a group of age-
matched controls on a number of different (visual) working
memory aspects. The first surprising result was that her per-
formance in the mental imagery task did not differ from
controls. However, her metacognitive performance on this
task was lower than that of controls; specifically, she over-
estimated her own performance on inaccurate trials. Thus,
although she was able to perform a task that was designed to
require mental imagery, she lacked insight into her perfor-
mance. Secondly, we found that when visual working mem-
ory required a high level of precision, her performance was
worse than that of control participants. Furthermore, within
our control sample high-precision working memory tended to
correlate with self-rated imagery vividness. Together, these
results indicate that although a lack of mental imagery can be
compensated for under some conditions, it may be important
for high precision WM as well as metacognition.
4.1. Intact performance on a mental imagery task
Because the intact performance of AI on the mental imagery
task is in essence a null result, we need to be careful in our
interpretations of this (lack of a) finding. But since it touches
upon the essential question of the functional relevance of
mental imagery, it deserves to be discussed nonetheless.
Unimpaired performance on an imagery task in an
aphantasic individual, who by definition cannot engage in
mental image generation, could mean either of two things; 1)
the task does not qualify as a mental imagery task, in the
sense that non-aphantasic participants do not utilize mental
imagery when executing it, or 2) even though control partici-
pants do employ mental imagery, our aphantasic participant
has developed an alternative strategy in order to achieve
decent performance levels. We consider the second explana-
tion to be the most plausible.emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
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Fig. 8 e Performance on Visual Working Memory (WM) and Mental Imagery (IM) tasks for the most difficult condition. Left
panel: Proportion of correct trials per task (right: WM; left: IM) for the aphantasic individual (AI; darkest gray), IQ-matched
controls (N ¼ 4; intermediate gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 11; light gray) for the most difficult condition only.
Right panel: Scatterplot depicting the relation between average WM accuracy on the most difficult trials and Vividness of
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) score within the control group. The slope of the dotted trend line is .55 (Pearson's R).
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 310The mental imagery task was designed in such a way that
participants were never physically presented with the infor-
mation they based their responses on, i.e., the contours of the
geometric shape they were instructed to imagine. This is the
fundamental difference from the working memory version of
the task. However, instead of generating amental image at the
start of each trial and actively keeping it on-line during the
delay interval, participants simply might have remembered
the spatial location of the place holders and created the  .50
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Fig. 9 e Performance for single feature and multi-feature
color trials. Proportion of correct trials for the single feature
color condition (Color; left) and multi-feature color
condition (Either Color; right) for the aphantasic individual
(AI; darkest gray), IQ-matched controls (N¼ 4; intermediate
gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 11; light gray) per
level of difficulty (left: high; middle: medium; right: low).
Error bars represent standard deviations. .5 is chance level.
Please cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014mental image only at the test stage of the trial. In doing so they
would have knowingly disregarded task instructions, but they
might have resorted to this strategy nonetheless if it were less
effortful or exhausting. In either case, control participants
engaged in mental imagery at some point during task execu-
tion and their behavioral performance therefore reflects a
series of cognitive processes involving mental imagery. .50
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Fig. 10 e Performance for single feature and multi-feature
shape trials. Proportion of correct trials for the single
feature shape condition (Shape; left) and multi-feature
shape condition (Either Shape; right) for the aphantasic
individual (AI; darkest gray), IQ-matched controls (N ¼ 4;
intermediate gray), and the overall control group (N ¼ 11;
light gray) per level of difficulty (left: high; middle: medium;
right: low). Error bars represent standard deviations. .5 is
chance level.
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as the metacognitive performance of controls was much bet-
ter than that of AI. This does not fit well with the view that AI
and controls use identical cognitive strategies, and therefore
we consider it most likely that controls were in fact engaging
in mental imagery while AI found an alternative way of
reaching high performance levels, but at the cost of meta-
cognitive insight. Zeman et al. (2010) also reported fairly intact
mental imagery performance, but with unusual overall pat-
terns of behavior, in a case of acquired aphantasia, which they
also take as evidence for alternative strategy employment by
their patient. They suggested that he might have generated
mental representations in a propositional, verbal code, rather
than as an actual perceivable image. This idea originates from
the work of Zenon Pylyshyn who proposed that mental im-
agery is not identical to visual perception, but that the visual
experiences which typically accompany imagery are in fact
the result of people inferring what they would see if they were
to witness the stored information (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2003a,b).
Our aphantasic participant's introspective reports are in line
with the concept of mental imagery being a form of ‘knowl-
edge’ rather than ‘perception’, because she reports simply
‘knowing’ what the correct answer is on this or any other
(everyday) task requiring mental imagery. This does not
necessarily imply knowledge stored verbally, but could also
involve a ‘spatial’ code, which represents the spatial relations
between the presented visual items during the encoding
stage.
A more speculative explanation is that aphantasic in-
dividuals in fact use mental imagery to perform mental im-
agery tasks, but without conscious awareness of the resultant
mental representation. A distinction has been made between
the underlying structure of the representation and its
conscious experience. In some views, the term “imagery” does
not refer to subjective experience, but, rather, to a hypothet-
ical picture-like representation (or inner representation of any
sort) in the mind and brain that can give rise to quasi-
perceptual conscious experience (Block, 1983). Possibly,
aphantasic individuals are capable of the former but not the
latter.
4.2. Impaired high-precision working memory
In the working memory experiment, the encoding and main-
tenance stages were identical across trials of all difficulty
levels. Rather, trials differed at the retrieval stage, because
task difficulty was defined by the spatial location of the target
stimulus (which needed to be compared to the outer contours
of the memory item). The selective deficit for high-precision
working memory in our aphantasic individual thus could
not have arisen from strategy adjustment at trial onset. It
either resulted 1) from an overall difference in strategy that
only emerged behaviorally on difficult trials, or 2) from a
cognitive difference that only arose after target stimulus
presentation. In the former case, controls might have utilized
mental imagery when performing the visual workingmemory
task, whereas AI created a different type of representation
(e.g., propositions, spatial or verbal code, see previous sec-
tion). Assuming that images can be maintained with a higher
level of detail compared to other types of mentalPlease cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014representation, on easy trials the non-pictorial representation
would offer enough quality to adequately perform the work-
ing memory task, but when high-precision is required, its
coarseness will have a measurable, negative effect on per-
formance. The very high levels of accuracy on the interme-
diate and difficult trials for both controls and AI could indeed
indicate ceiling effects, which explains the lack of any per-
formance difference in these conditions. However, this fails to
explain why these difficulty effects are specific to the working
memory task.
Alternatively, on those difficult WM trials, controls may
have begun to use visual imagery at the test phase (i.e., they
may have constructed a mental image in order to perform the
task more effectively). The use of this additional cognitive
processwas not available to AI due to her inability to engage in
imagery e she had to rely solely on WM processes. In other
words, the ability of controls (but not of AI) to use imagery to
boost performance on difficult trials may underlie AI's worse
performance on those trials. This is supported by the finding
that for controls, imagery vividness correlated with WM per-
formance for difficult trials. In the imagery task, there would
have been no such possibility for the controls to engage in an
additional cognitive process to enhance performance (as they
were already engaged in imagery as per task requirement). If
AI adopted the same strategy for both tasks, measures of her
performance across the two tasks could be prone to learning
effects. Indeed, the current effect appeared to be driven by AI's
better performance on the mental imagery than on the
working memory task (note that task order was working
memory session followed by mental imagery session across
all participants; see Table 1). On the other hand, varied
cognitive operations between high-precision working mem-
ory and mental imagery tasks can explain the absence of a
similar learning effect in controls.
So far, we have considered what role mental imagery
potentially plays in working memory, but in fact the associa-
tion could be reversed. Then the mental imagery difficulties
that AI experiences would originate from a visual working
memory deficit. According to Robert Logie (2003), mental
image generation relies on the so-called central executive; a
non-sensory system that drives the phonological and visuo-
spatial slave systems in which information is actually main-
tained. However, if impaired executive processing would un-
derlie aphantasia, then instead of only affecting high-
precision visual working memory, AIs scores on other (work-
ing memory) tasks would have been hampered as well. But
both her score on the working memory subscale of the WAIS-
IV (WMI) and her working memory capacity proved similar or
better than controls'. This leaves the visuo-sketchpad as the
potential workingmemory component affected in aphantasia.
There is indeed evidence showing mental image formation is
prevented by loading the visuo-spatial sketchpad with dy-
namic visual noise (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Moreover, AI
could have relied on the other slave system, i.e., the phono-
logical loop, while executing the workingmemory tasks of the
WAIS-IV and the working memory capacity battery. Still, the
specificity of AIs working memory deficits and the lack of any
mental imagery impairments seem to be at odds with the
broad functionality of the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The visuo-
spatial sketchpad has been suggested to consist of two sub-emory performance in aphantasia, Cortex (2017), https://doi.org/
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 312components with different functionalities: a passive visual
cachewhich stores information about shape and color, and an
inner scribe which stores motion and spatial information and
is involved in active short-term memory processing (Logie,
1995, 2003). Perhaps aphantasia is linked to difficulties in
either one of these subsystems specifically. Unfortunately, we
did not isolate the related visual memory processes with any
of the taskswe included, so we cannot look to our data to shed
light on this issue.
Recent studies on individual differences of visual working
memory and mental imagery have demonstrated a relation
with primary visual cortex (V1) size. Bergmann, Genc, Kohler,
Singer, & Pearson, (2016b) found that individuals with a
smaller V1 experience more vivid, but less precise mental
imagery. Conceivably, mental imagery vividness is a contin-
uously distributed population variable, which suggests AI
could be one of the individuals at the lower end of the spec-
trum with a corresponding larger V1. Inconsistent with the
mental imagery findings of Bergmann et al. (2016b) however,
she also shows a lower precision of visual working memory. A
similar study on visual working memory has so far shown a
positive correlation between working memory capacity and
V1 size (Bergmann, Genc, Kohler, Singer, & Pearson, 2016a),
but memory precision was not varied in this design. Future
MRI work is needed to elucidate the relation between V1 size
and different aspects of visual cognition in aphantasic in-
dividuals. Specifically, such studies could shed light on
whether the (neuroanatomical) difference between imagers
and non-imagers is qualitatively different or not.
4.3. Single-feature versus multi-feature memory
We originally included the Wheeler and Treisman (2002) task
because we were interested in the binding condition particu-
larly. Based on our earlier theoretical work (Jacobs & Silvanto,
2015) in which we link mental imagery to feature-binding, we
hypothesized that feature-binding might be more effortful in
aphantasic individuals. However, we did not find a negative
effect of aphantasia on binding. If anything, AI performed
better than controls in this condition (see Tables 2 and 3).
Furthermore, AIs visual working memory is less sensitive to
the number of to-be-remembered features than controls. This
couldmean that she applies a form of chunking, i.e., items are
remembered as integrated objects, not as a collection of
separate features (Luck & Vogel, 1997), whereas controls store
all features separately. Performance in the binding condition
should have benefited from chunking. Although there is a
significant drop in AI's performance from the four other con-
ditions to the binding condition, she still outperforms controls
(see Tables 2 and 3). However, we did not statistically test for
this positive effect, because it was not part of our a priori
hypotheses. Also, there is no apparent reason as to why
aphantasia would be associated with chunking in visual
working memory. Alternatively, as participants knew before
the start of each block whether it was going to be a single-
feature or multi-feature block, they could have increased
motivation or putmore effort into these blocks to compensate
for increased difficulty. Since trial-by-trial feedback was given
as well, participants were well aware of their relative perfor-
mance across conditions. But, again, there does not seem to bePlease cite this article in press as: Jacobs, C., et al., Visual working m
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014an evident reason why AI's motivation would surpass
controls'.5. Conclusion
What do these results tell us about the functional role of
mental imagery in visual working memory? First, that for
many tasks that supposedly involving mental imagery there
are alternative cognitive strategies that lead to equally suc-
cessful behavior. This by no means implies that mental im-
agery has no part to play in working memory whatsoever;
there are circumstances in which the visual experience of
stored content contributes to working memory. Here we have
identified high-precision task demands as one of them, but
there might be others. In more general terms, this study has
shown the potential of using aphantasia as a model for
studying the functional relevance ofmental imagery for visual
cognition.
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